The low prices in the European Emission Trading System (EU ETS) have triggered discussions of various possible reforms. One option is to decouple the CO 2 prices from renewable energy policy by adjusting the emission cap to renewable energy investment overshoots. We introduce two ways of reducing the CO 2 cap in response to overshoots of renewable policy investment over previously announced targets. We investigate these options with the agent-based model EMLab-generation. We find that both policy implementations are successful in restoring prices. They also ensure that making public investments that exceed policy targets contribute to carbon emission reduction, and that renewable policy does not benefit the most emission-intensive power plants. However, neither policy is suitable for achieving specifc levels of prices or price volatility.
Introduction 1
When a stringent emission trading system (ETS) is in place, the establishment of a renewable energy policy does 2 not lead to additional emission reductions 1 [1] . Indeed, within the electricity sector the emission reductions due to [11, 8, 12 ] to find citing literature. We propose two heuristics for calculating cap reductions dynamically. We evaluate 23 the two policies by extending the agent-based model (ABM) EMLab-Generation with these dynamic cap reduction 24 mechanisms. We use an ABM because we wish to model realistic limitations to investment decisions such as the 25 financial constraints and myopia of market participants (they do not know the future), the discreteness of investment 26 choices in power plants. Since rule-based mechanisms act with a delay they cause dynamic effects which may even 27 exacerbate the CO 2 price shocks which the policy is supposed to mitigate. These can be captured best with a dynamic 28 model. 29 
Related literature

30
The policy investigated in this paper is related to two strands of literature: on the one hand to the very broad 31 category of ETS and renewable policy interactions, and on the other hand to the discussion of ETS design options, 32 and more specifically possible reforms of the EU ETS.
33
Given the current state of technology, both climate and renewable policies are considered as necessary for achiev-34 ing carbon and climate policy goals simultaneously and efficiently, while a single policy would achieve its respective 35 single goal more efficiently [4, 13] (this does not necessarily hold theoretically [14] ). While both RES quota and 36 carbon prices are impacted by the other policy, it is usually found that the decreasing effect on prices in the ETS by 37 a RES policy is stronger than the other way around [13, 5] , until the ETS cap no longer is binding and the carbon 38 price drops to zero. In terms of wealth redistribution, RES policy tends to relatively decrease consumer bills (this 39 is known as the merit order effect, which may or may not 2 outweigh the increase in subsidy spending [15, 16] ) and 40 reduce producer rents, while the opposite is true for carbon policy [13, 17] . Del Río [12] and Del Río et al. [8] give 41 a broader overview of the ETS and renewable policy interactions. Related to the discussion on cap reduction is the 42 2 Depending on the design of the subsidy scheme and the cost of the used technologies. topic of fungibility [12] , that is the convertibility of credits in RES quota systems to ETS permits. However, since this 43 leads to problems of double crediting [12] and RES policy is not uniformly organised in quota systems in Europe, we 44 do not analyse this option further. 45 Grosjean et al. [10] provide a comprehensive overview of possible EU ETS reforms and place them in a two-46 dimensional reform space that is spanned by the degree of delegation and the balance between price and quantity certainty in an ETS (with a pure ETS having total quantity certainty). As the authors point out, cap adjustment based 48 on indices, as suggested by the IETA [9], would be a "rule-based" approach which would increase price certainty in 49 the ETS. As we discuss later, price uncertainty is not likely to be minimised unless all relevant indices are included 50 in such a mechanism. Notable long-term reforms that are currently being discussed are the Market Stability Reserve
51
(MSR, evaluated for example in [18, 19, 10, 20] ), price corridors (see [21, 22, 22, 10] ) and a central carbon bank
52
[23, 10, 24] . These policies all adjust the emission cap, but in more general ways than the cap adjustment policy 53 discussed in this paper. The MSR adjusts the cap based on the volume of banked ETS permits, the price corridor 54 restricts price movements (and thereby automatically providing less or more EUAs to the market) and the central 55 bank works in a discretionary manner. Several arguments can be brought forward in support of a cap adjustment based on subsidised renewable electricity 58 sources (SRES). Renewable energy policies impact both electricity markets and, as discussed previously, carbon 59 markets. As can be seen in Figure 1 , and discussed previously, renewable energy policy does not lead to emission 60 reductions when the ETS cap is binding [11, 3, 8, 12] . Instead, the marginal abatement cost curve is shifted to the 61 left and the EUA price drops (from point A with price p 1 to point B with price p 2 ). A cap adjustment policy that 62 effectively offsets the impact of SRES on carbon prices should reduce policy uncertainty for private investors in CO 2 63 abatement. In Figure 1 , the objective would be to adjust the cap so the intersection of the demand curve and the cap 64 would be in point C and the price would be p 1 again. For example, it should be possible to offset the effect of a sudden 65 increase in investment in renewable energy, as can happen under a price-based policy. An example is the boom in photovoltaic installations in Germany, which occurred under a feed-in-tariff.
67
A second argument for adjusting the CO 2 cap to unexpected increases in SRES is that it reinstates one of the 68 key benefits of, and arguments for, renewable energy policy, namely that it reduces carbon emissions. In the past, 69 the Dutch government, for example, issued cost-benefit analyses of offshore wind projects in which the CO 2 benefits 70 where judged to be zero [25, 26] . It could also be expected that a cap adjustment policy would reduce the required 71 subsidy per unit of SRES, since the market revenues from renewables rise with a higher carbon price. Del Río et al.
72
[8] further point out that cap adjustment might increase the long-term dynamic efficiency because it supports the CO 2 73 price; lower CO 2 prices and the shift to more polluting power plant might lead to less innovation in low-emission 3 While the EU ETS is limited in its scope to influence the global climate, in the long run, global climate policy is intended lead to regional climate policies that together avoid global warming. 4 We assume the climate policy goal to be a minimum goal in this paper.
The second challenge is to calculate the extent of the cap reduction, a task which is far from trivial for a regulator 
116
The remaining approach is to set the volume of additional SRES in proportion to directly observable quantities of 117 production: the entire generation mix, or only the non-subsidised part of the generation mix. In case of the proportional 118 reduction with regard to the total electricity production, the CO 2 cap in t is reduced proportionally to the excess SRES
119
of the previous year (G S RES ,t−1 − G S RES ,Announced,t−1 ) over the total electricity production of the previous year (G t−1 ).
120
This is termed in this paper as total electricity production-based adjustment or short TBA.
In case the reduction is only proportional to the non-subsidised electricity production, the CO 2 in t is reduced 122 in proportion to the excess SRES of the previous year (G S RES ,t−1 − G S RES ,Announced,t−1 ) over the originally planned 123 electricity production of all non-subsidised generators (termed from now on relative electricity production based 124 adjustment, RBA). This is equal to reducing the cap proportionally to the amount of non-subsidised electricity that has 125 5 Since the policy is currently not implemented, it is open who would have that regulatory power. The European Commission would be a logical option. 6 We confirmed this effect in simulations, but decided to exclude it from the paper for conciseness.
been displaced by SRES. The cap reduction is thus stronger than in the RBA case.
While we limit our analysis to the power sector, the two approaches can be extended to the entire ETS by consid-127 ering all SRES generation (including non electric sources) in comparison to all energy consumption that is covered 128 by the EU ETS. As an overview the discussed design options, their characteristics and whether they are simulated in 129 this work are given in Table 1 . 
Choice of modelling methodology
131
The long-term development of electricity markets and carbon markets is characterised by several features which Agent-based models (ABM) are well suited to match these challenging characteristics. In an ABM, the behaviour 141 of a system is modelled by introducing autonomous decision making entities (the agents), who assess situations and . The model has time steps of one year length, and the electricity load is approximated via 167 a load duration curve with different segments (load levels), based on ENTSOE data from 2010.
168
The main agents of the model are energy producers. They submit bids to the electricity markets (based on the fuel rounds, where investment actions of the agents are reflected in subsequent profitability calculations of other agents.
176
When no energy producer is willing to invest any more the investment rounds are stopped.
177
The other important agent of the model is the ElectricitySpotMarket agent which clears the joint electricity and 178 carbon market, including modelling the joint banking behaviour of the energy producers 10 . It does so by clearing 179 7 Caused by their limited foresight, but also by their limited ability to bank CO 2 permits above their hedging needs due to risk management procedures. 8 The model and input data used for this paper can be found at: https://github.com/EMLab/emlab-generation/tree/paper/resCapAdaption 9 Technologies are based on the World Energy Outlook 2011 New Policies Scenario [41] and additional assumptions [22] . 10 This is a departure from pure ABM modelling; however, the focus of this models lies in the long-run not the short-term the two electricity spot markets via market coupling: first the market is cleared for all segments of the load duration curve under no transmission constraints (operational are not considered). If the existing interconnected capacity is not 181 exceeded the market is considered as cleared (done individually for the different segments). Otherwise the markets 182 are cleared separately with the market loads adjusted by the interconnector capacity. This clearing of the electricity 183 markets is nested in an iterative price search for an EUA price which clears the CO 2 market. The clearing condition 184 for the CO 2 market is encapsulated in the following condition:
It states that emissions of the current year (E t , dependent on the EUA price p t,CO2 ) and the expected emissions in needs, yet some inter-temporal optimisation takes place. volume of subsidised renewable energy production that exceeds the policy targets. In the first, the SRES excess is 200 set in proportion to the total electricity production (TBA). In the second, it is only set in proportion to unsubsidised 201 electricity production only (RBA). We assume that implementation is based on observed data, which is available with The adjustment of the cap needs to be implemented in two parts of the electricity & carbon market clearing. Firstly 206 in the current cap C CO 2 ,t,T BA or C CO 2 ,t,RBA , which replaces C CO 2 ,t in Equation (3). This is a certain adjustment, because
207
it occurs in the current year. Secondly, in the future the expected capĈ CO 2 ,t+3,RBA orĈ CO 2 ,t+3,T BA , depending on the, 
213Ĉ
CO 2 ,t+3,RBA = (1 − max(Ĝ S RES ,t+2 − G S RES ,Announced,t+2 , 0)
Since the renewable and overall generation in t+2 needs to be estimated, the values forĜ t+2 ,Ĝ t+2 andĜ S RES ,t+2 are and G S REG,Announced,t+2 need to be calculated as a counter-factual scenario. This is done by scaling the production 218 according to the ratio of the planned capacity to the actual installed capacity. 
Investment in RES 220
In order to represent renewable policy in the model, an investor with exogenous renewable investment time series is 221 implemented in the model. In deviation from [22], renewable energy policy is also a stochastic parameter in this paper.
222
The national governments in the simulation have announced renewable policy targets in terms of absolute capacity 223 targets, however actual renewable investment by governments may deviate from it. This is done in order to depict the 224 uncertainty that private market parties face when it comes to renewable policy. The implementation takes the yearly 225 installation target and multiplies it with a stochastic realisation drawn from a normal distribution (separately for each 226 year, so over time governments achieve there targets on average). In the case of this paper the normal distribution has 
Model results and discussion
231
We combine the discussion and analysis of our results in one section. We begin with the description of the 232 scenarios used in our analysis. Next, we present our model results regarding the effects of the different CO 2 cap 233 adjustments on CO 2 prices and emissions in Section 3.2. All statistical evaluations and graphs were made in GNU R
234
[45].
235
11 Denoted by a hat above the forecasted variables 12 That is, for a case in which the government just reaches its policy targets, the mean of the distribution is 1. In a scenarios where the government over-achieves its targets by 50% the distribution mean is 1.5. 
Scenarios
236
We investigate three CO 2 policy scenarios: the original EU ETS ("PureETS", following the EU ETS cap reduction 237 scaled to CWE and the UK, but without the backloading measure), the adaption of the emission cap based on the total 238 electricity production as a baseline ("TBA") and the emission cap adaption based only on the non-subsidised part of 239 the electricity generation as a baseline ("RBA"). We also vary the overshoot of renewable installations in excess of the 
249
Since we want our results to be robust against different fuels, demand and renewable capacity variations, we con- 
Results and analysis
257
The main focus of the results section is on the differences in EUA price development between the different sce-258 narios (Section 3.3) and on the effect of the policy on CO 2 emissions (Section 3.4). of the price difference, the darker shaded area corresponds to a 50% envelope, and the lighter area to a 90% envelope.
266
As can be seen in the first row, which depicts the PureETS case under different renewable deployment scenar-267 ios, the stronger the renewable deployment, the stronger the carbon price drop, as compared to the planned SRES Comparing the cap adjustment scenarios in the lower two rows to the PureETS scenario, it can be seen that in Strong median EUA price drops as compared to 0POvershoot scenario.
Median EUA price drops partly compensated as compared to the overshoot scenario.
Median EUA price drops nearly fully compensated as compared to the overshoot scenarios. zero line. This means the price drop that is induced by excess SRES is mitigated in the mean case of all renewable 278 deployment scenarios. However, the range of uncertainty is relatively large, with both far higher and lower prices 279 occurring than in the corresponding PureETS-0POvershoot scenario. In most cases of the TBA scenario, the price 280 deviation is still negative, which means that despite the cap adjustment the prices are still lower than without the 281 SRES overshoot. Only in a few outlier cases, in a limited number of years, does the cap adjustment overcompensate the effect of the excess renewable deployment. In the RBA scenario, the price adjustment is stronger. While in most 283 years the median line is slightly below zero, in the last years of the simulation the price is over compensated. The 284 stronger price compensation is no surprise. Per definition, the volume of non-subsidised generation is smaller than 285 total generation in a given year. Thus the denominator in the RBA equation (Equation (2)) is smaller than in the
286
RBA equation ((Equation (1)), resulting in a stronger cap adjustment. emission reductions, but to a shift in the market to more polluting power plants.
324
As can be seen, both the TBA and RBA reduce the emission cap, rendering additional renewable policy beyond Our simulation confirms the analytic result of Böhringer and Rosendahl [3] , that "green promotes the dirtiest" in 333 a dynamic transition setting. Figure 6 shows the relative share in generation of lignite, the "dirtiest" technology in 334 our simulation, over the three CO 2 and four renewable scenarios (we exclude the investment surge scenario for an 335 easier to read figure). As can be seen, in the PureETS case, the larger the overshoot, the larger is the share of lignite 14 It is a Gaussian kernel density estimate, using the R inbuilt function density. 15 On average emissions are slightly above 1, since agents start out with banked EUA permits. They reduce thus starting stock over the course of the simulation, which leads to emissions over the cap. 
Conclusions and policy implications
sidised renewable electricity generation as compared to the policy targets for renewable energy. The goals of such a make public subsidies in renewable energy climate-effective.
345
While the concept is fairly straightforward, devising a cap reduction policy that removes the impact of renewable 346 policy on CO 2 prices is not a simple task for a regulator because he would need perfect knowledge to create counter-347 factual scenarios in order to correctly adjust the cap. We propose two ways to adjust the CO 2 cap to unexpectedly high 348 investment in renewable energy generation. They reduce the cap in proportion to the volume of subsidised renewable 349 electricity generation that exceeds ex-ante government targets, as compared to either total generation (termed TBA),
350
or as compared to the originally planned electricity production of all non-subsidised generators (termed RBA). We 351 use the agent-based model EMLab-Generation, which simulates the investment in two electricity markets (based on
352
Central-Western Europe and Great Britain) to investigate the possible effects of such a policy implementation.
353
We find that both policy implementations perform reasonably well within the simulation with regard to the afore- the counter-factual scenario; however, it sometimes leads to higher CO 2 prices. Both policies reduce the cap and the 358 emissions in the simulation, and thus render public investment above governments minimum targets climate-effective.
359
The policies also undo the "green promotes the dirtiest" effect [3] , so that an overshoot in renewable energy results in 360 less electricity generation by the most emission-intensive power plants.
361
It should be noted that neither method of CO 2 cap adjustment is suitable for achieving specific CO 2 price goals or 362 volatility goals because they merely restore a counterfactual CO 2 price that would have existed without the renewable 363 energy policy overshoot, which may be relatively high or low, volatile or not. To achieve these aims, price floors and 364 price caps [22, 21] or an independent authority adjusting the cap [23] would be better suited.
365
As the cap adjustment policies lead to higher CO 2 prices, they should lower the need for financial support for 366 renewable generation. However, this effect appears to be small and declines over time as the power plant stock is 367 decarbonised and carbon-intensive power plants set the marginal price less frequently. 
